This is an excellent and complex historical question. The idea that corrupt regimes "eat themselves from the inside out" is a powerful metaphor, but its validity depends on definitions, timeframe, and the specific mechanisms at play. Here are arguments for, against, and nuanced viewpoints.

Arguments FOR: Yes, They Tend to Self-Destruct

1. Erosion of State Capacity: Corruption diverts public resources into private hands, starving state institutions (military, bureaucracy, infrastructure, education). A weakened state cannot respond to crises, enforce laws, or provide basic services, leading to loss of legitimacy and eventual collapse. Example: The late Roman Empire, where the sale of offices and tax farming crippled administrative efficiency and military readiness.

2. Destruction of Meritocracy: In a corrupt system, loyalty and bribes trump competence. This leads to the promotion of inept officials, which degrades governance, economic performance, and military leadership. Over time, the regime becomes staffed by sycophants incapable of solving real problems. Example: The Soviet Union's nomenklatura system created a stagnant, self-serving elite disconnected from economic realities.

3. Internal Elite Fragmentation: Corruption often involves competing patronage networks vying for spoils. This can turn into violent intra-elite conflict when resources shrink or succession crises occur. The regime consumes itself in factional fights. Example: The Salvadoran "Fourteen Families" oligarchy, whose internal rivalries contributed to political instability and civil war.

4. Undermining of Social Trust and Cohesion: Pervasive corruption destroys the social contract. Citizens see the state as predatory rather than protective, leading to widespread cynicism, tax evasion, and a willingness to support alternatives (rebellions, revolutions, or foreign intervention). Example: The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings were fueled in part by deep public anger over kleptocracy and nepotism.

5. Economic Hollowing Out: Systemic corruption discourages productive investment, encourages capital flight, and creates distorted, inefficient economies ("rent-seeking"). This leads to long-term economic stagnation or decline, which destabilizes the regime by creating popular discontent and reducing the funds available for patronage. Example: Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe, where cronyism and land seizures destroyed the agricultural export economy.

Arguments AGAINST: No, They Can Be Remarkably Resilient

1. Co-optation Over Confrontation: Corrupt regimes are often adept at using stolen resources to buy off potential opponents—key military officers, business elites, media figures, and middle-class constituencies. This creates a broad coalition with a vested interest in the status quo. Example: The long rule of the PRI in Mexico (71 years) was maintained through a vast system of patronage and controlled corruption.

2. Fear and Repression as Stabilizers: Corruption and authoritarianism frequently coexist. The regime can use its security apparatus, funded by corrupt means, to suppress dissent. The internal "eating" is directed outward against the population, not inward. Example: North Korea's regime, profoundly corrupt, maintains stability through extreme repression and a ideology that justifies elite privilege.

3. External Support and Resource Curses: Corrupt regimes can survive for decades if they have external patrons (for geopolitical reasons) or control over valuable natural resources (oil, minerals). The resource wealth allows them to fund security forces and patronage without needing an efficient, productive economy or popular consent. Example: The enduring rule of the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia or the Gulf monarchies, where oil wealth manages social contracts and funds immense patronage networks.

4. Adaptive Corruption: Some systems institutionalize corruption in a way that provides predictability (e.g., set bribe rates, understood rules for business). While inefficient, this can create a perverse form of stability, as elites and even the public learn to navigate the system. Example: Indonesia under Suharto's "New Order" (1967-1998) featured highly centralized and predictable corruption (KKN), ensuring three decades of rule.

5. The "Succession" Paradox: While elite infighting can cause collapse, it can also be a mechanism for renewal. A corrupt regime may purge one faction, bringing in a new set of elites, without fundamentally changing the corrupt system. The "self-eating" is limited and cyclical. Example: Chinese dynastic cycles often ended with a rebellion that replaced one corrupt imperial court with another, replicating similar structures.

Nuanced Viewpoints and Implications

• The Difference Between Personal and Institutional Corruption: A regime centered on one leader's personal graft (e.g., Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire) is more fragile than one with institutionalized, rule-bound corruption spread across a party or military (e.g., post-Soviet United Russia). The latter can survive the death of any individual.

• The Role of Information and Technology: Historically, corrupt regimes could control narratives. In the digital age, it is harder to hide elite plunder from the public, potentially accelerating discontent. However, technology also enables new forms of surveillance and control.

• Time Horizon Matters: In the short to medium term (years to a few decades), corrupt regimes can be strikingly stable through co-optation and repression. In the long term (multi-decade or century scale), the systemic inefficiencies and eroded legitimacy they create make them highly vulnerable to internal decay or external shocks. Historians often see the collapse as inevitable, but political scientists note it can be delayed indefinitely under the right conditions.

• Implication for Policy: The "self-eating" argument suggests that external actors should often wait out corrupt regimes, as they will eventually implode. The counter-argument is that this process can take generations and cause immense human suffering, justifying intervention or support for internal opposition. The resilience argument warns that sanctions or pressure often just tighten the elite's circle, making corruption worse and the regime more brutal.

Conclusion: While corruption introduces powerful centrifugal and degenerative forces that tend to undermine a regime's long-term viability, it is not an automatic death sentence. Corrupt regimes can be politically "successful" in maintaining power for extended periods by mastering the arts of elite co-optation, repression, and resource management. The historical record shows that they often die from a combination of internal rot and an external catalyst (war, economic shock, popular uprising). The metaphor of "eating itself from the inside out" is apt for the terminal phase, but it overlooks the long, stable, and destructive middle age that many such regimes enjoy.